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Abstract 
We examine the influence of different rewards, cash penalties and altruistic donations on cheating 
behavior of university students by conducting four experiments with undergraduate students of 
business economics, psychology and IT engineering. They were asked to toss a coin in private 
and we randomly assigned participants to conditions in which we manipulated the reward for a 
winning toss and the penalty when losing. We found that business economics students were 
significantly more dishonest regardless of whether the reward was a chocolate truffle or cash, and 
no matter if there was a penalty involved when losing. However, if the penalty was a donation to 
a non-profit organization, business economics students had the highest level of altruism. We 
additionally observed changes in the likelihood of lying when reporting the donations by 
manipulating the prior notice, suggesting that prior notice decreases the tendency to lie. 
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1. Introduction 
Not a single day goes by without a new case of accounting fraud, audit fraud, tax evasion 
or corruption on the news. What does this mean? That someone cheated again. The underlying 
conflict between self-interest and social interest can be attributed to individual decisions about 
being honest versus behaving advantageously. If you ask yourself “Have I ever told a lie, even a 
very innocent one?” The (honest) answer is likely to be, “Of course, maybe even daily”. This 
implies that cheating is undoubtedly widespread and is damaging not only individuals' own 
trustworthiness but also the economic principles in general, causing extraordinary financial and 
social costs (Mazar and Ariely, 2006). Despite the substantial body of experimental studies in the 
economics and social psychology literature about dishonesty (e.g. Fischbacher and Heusi, 2013; 
Gneezy, 2005; Houser, Vetter and Winter, 2012; Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008; Pascual-Ezama, 
Prelec and Dunfield, 2013), there is still a need to study the intersection between the stream of 
research about dishonesty and the altruistic behavior. 
In this paper we investigate whether different rewards, cash penalties and donations affect 
cheating behavior of university students. We focus our attention on individuals currently studying 
the bachelor degrees of business economics, psychology and IT engineering. In addition, we also 
examine lying behavior by testing the tendency to lie about their donations, and the effect of a 
prior notice –telling or not in advance that they had to report donations– on lying. To address 
these questions, we conducted four experiments using 540 students. In Experiments 1 and 2, 
participants were asked to flip a white/black coin in private, so they were given the opportunity 
to cheat because nobody could see the outcome. In the task of Experiments 3A and 3B, recipients 
decided about a cash donation. A summary of the four experiments appears in Table 1, containing 
their purposes, task, conditions, participants and location of each experiment. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
In Experiment 1, with a chocolate truffle reward when winning the task, we examine the 
effect of cash penalties and donations on cheating behavior by academic discipline. Previous 
literature has already suggested that there are differences in cheating behavior by academic 
disciplines (e.g., Bowers, 1964; Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993; McCabe and Treviño, 1993). 
Bowers (1964) found that business students and engineers were among those with the lowest rates 
of truth-telling, perhaps due to more demanding performance goals. Frank et al. (1993) stated that 
the self-interest model persuade economists to be less generous than others due to their training 
in profit maximizing. They argued that economists act uncooperatively in social dilemmas as a 
result of their training, and that economists expect others to cheat as well. Similarly, McCabe and 
Treviño (1993) concluded that there are significant differences in cheating behavior among 
students from several degrees. Concretely, they found the highest level of cheating on economists, 
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followed by engineers, science and humanities students. All these findings go in line with the 
classic approach of the standard economic model. According to this model, individuals behave as 
homo economicus (Becker, 1968; Hill and Kochendorfer, 1969; Michales and Miethe, 1989), 
which implies that dishonest actions are based on a simple cost-benefit analysis that depends only 
on two inputs: the amount to be gained and the expected punishment of being caught (Gino et al. 
2009). Thus, in agreement with proponents of the standard economic model, we expect business 
economics students to cheat more than other students as they have paid more attention to 
economic models in their studies. More precisely, to add to this line of inquiry, we theorize that 
business economics students may cheat more than non-economics either including or not a cash 
penalty when losing the task. 
In addition, in Experiment 1 and regarding the effect of donations on cheating behavior, 
we follow the proponents of the self-concept maintenance approach. The proponents of this 
approach agree on the fact that business economics students are likely to cooperate in altruistic 
activities due to their desire to maintain a positive self-concept. Frank et al. (1993) stated that 
economists might be more altruistic as they have been trained in traditional communitarian ways 
developing voluntary support activities. Later, Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen (1996) found 
evidence of altruistic tendencies in economists in an experiment where students in upper level 
classes were more likely to return money unfairly awarded. When analyzing dues payments to 
professional organizations, Laband and Beil (1999) suggested that professional economists are 
significantly more cooperative than political scientists and sociologists. Also, Hu and Liu (2003) 
showed that economics degrees tend to behave more altruistically and cooperatively than non-
economics. However, other prior research supports the idea that economics students might donate 
less to charities (Bauman and Rose, 2011; Carter and Irons, 1991; Marwell and Ames, 1981) in 
accordance with the rational self-interest model, which predicts their lack of generosity and their 
selfishness. These mixed findings have inspired us to test how different students react when losing 
a task conducted in private implies the payment of an out-of-pocket donation to a non-profit 
organization. As previously stated, following the most popular approach of the self-concept 
maintenance theory, we propose that business economics students are more altruistic than other 
students. 
Further, we also add evidence to the core studies of the interconnection between cheating 
behavior and altruism with our Experiment 1based on the self-concept maintenance approach 
(Gneezy, Imas and Madarász, 2014; Mazar and Ariely, 2006; Mazar et al., 2008). Individuals try 
to find internal psychological reward mechanisms to self-justify unethical behaviors (Mazar and 
Ariely, 2006; Mazar et al., 2008). In addition, as per Gneezy et al. (2014), greater levels of 
altruism have a dampening effect on cheating because subjects become aware of behaving more 
ethically and cooperatively with others. They found that donations to charity increase after an 
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immoral choice, so that when feelings of guilt are emphasized, individuals might refrain from 
breaking internal moral constraints. Gino, Ayal and Ariely (2013) even suggested that individuals 
cheat more if the unethical action increased the benefits to others, creating a situation in which 
dishonesty can be viewed as morally acceptable. These results suggest that when altruism is made 
salient, individuals pay attention to their own moral standards and their self-concepts, decreasing 
their tendencies to engage in dishonest actions. Accordingly, we expect cheating behavior to 
decrease in all majors when altruism plays a role in the task performed. 
We conduct Experiment 2 for various purposes. First, we verify the altruistic findings of 
Experiment 1 with a cash reward instead of a chocolate truffle. Second, we also add evidence to 
the literature about lying behavior. In line with the cost-benefit approach or standard economic 
model, the opinion of Lundquist et al. (2009) is that economics degrees are more likely to lie than 
non-economics because economic models learned at university lead them to behave as homo 
economicus. Similarly, Lewis et al. (2012) showed that economics students are more apt to lie 
than non-economics, and López-Pérez and Spiegelman (2019) indicated that business students 
are significantly less lie averse than those in other disciplines, as they probably expect others to 
lie as well because they deal with competitive environments. Following this reasoning, it is 
rational to believe that business economics students are going to be the group that lie the most. 
To the best of our knowledge, scholars have apparently ignored the connection between cheating, 
altruism and lying, so this lack of explanation has inspired this study to test how these three 
behaviors interact in different students. 
Finally, our Experiments 3A and 3B contribute to understanding the ethical dilemma of 
lying. With their designs we study the tendency to lie about cash donations made manipulating 
the prior notice (not telling recipients in advance that they are going to be asked for the amount 
donated). Whereas in Experiment 3A the experimenter did not warn participants about the fact 
that they were going to be asked about the cash donated at the end, in Experiment 3B participants 
were aware of it before performing the task. There is recent evidence based on the self-concept 
maintenance approach that supports the idea that subjects are more likely to report higher private 
donations to charities after a lying decision (Maggian, 2019). Also, respondents are concerned 
about their social image, so they are more likely to behave altruistically if they know that they are 
going to be asked about their actions (Dellavigna et al., 2016). Thus, we expect participants to 
donate more when recipients know in advance that their donations are going to be questioned. In 
order to maintain the self-image, we also expect a tendency to lie and over report the donations 
when participants do not receive a prior notice. 
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2. Experiment 1: Effects of cash penalties and altruism on cheating 
 In the first experiment we studied the effect of cash penalties and donations on cheating 
behavior. Our participants were students from three different bachelor degrees. It seems that 
university students represent a relevant sample to analyze because cheating in educational 
environments, such as colleges and universities, is a widespread and growing phenomenon 
(Bucciol, Cicognani & Montinari, 2017). Our experiment consisted of three conditions. The 
control condition or no penalty condition (NP) served as a baseline for the performance of the 
task –to flip a white/black coin in private– and for the magnitude of cheating, as participants were 
not punished for getting the bad outcome. In the second condition –penalty condition (P)–, the 
experimenter clearly explained to participants at the onset of the experiment that, in case of losing, 
an out-of-pocket cash penalty had to be paid. In the final condition –altruistic penalty condition 
(AP)–, the experimenter made it clear to participants that the cash penalty paid if losing 
represented a donation to a non-profit organization. In the three conditions, participants performed 
the coin-toss task in private, so they had the opportunity to cheat without being exposed to anyone. 
Thus, for our analyses, cheating could not be determined on an individual level. 
 By comparing the results of the three conditions, we were able to examine the influence 
of two effects on cheating: cash penalties and altruism. On one hand, according to the cost-benefit 
approach, cheating with the exposure to a cash penalty in case of losing should have increased 
the tendency to behave unethical. Therefore, cheating should be higher in the penalty condition 
(P) than in the no penalty condition (NP). On the other hand, according to the self-concept 
maintenance approach, we expect lower cheating behavior after knowing that the penalty 
represented a donation to a non-profit organization, in order to maintain people's self-image. 
Although the general behavior is to avoid cash penalties, when payments represent donations the 
ethical threshold gets more restrictive and people tend to be more generous. Thus, cheating should 
be higher in the penalty condition (P) than in the altruistic penalty condition (AP). 
Method 
Participants 
 Two hundred and seventy students (52% female; N=141/270) from public universities in 
Madrid participated in the study. They were students of three bachelor degrees: business 
economics (N = 90), psychology (N = 90) and IT engineering (N = 90). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: control or no penalty condition (NP), penalty 
condition (P), and altruistic penalty condition (AP). Participants joined the experiment voluntarily 
and they were tempted to enroll by a visible poster which explicitly announced “Is this your lucky 
day? Flip a coin and win a chocolate!” 
Design and procedure 
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 The experiment consisted of a coin task replication in which every participant tossed a 
white/black coin in private (Pascual-Ezama et al., 2015). The ones who reported the prize-winning 
side (the white side) earned prize: a chocolate truffle. Since the experimenter was unable to see 
the toss, participants had an embedded incentive to cheat if the outcome was black. We ran the 
task on campus, outside the lab, on a side of the main hallway or in a corner of the cafeteria, where 
many students were passing nearby. The surroundings were the same in the three conditions and 
the answers were not distorted because participants did not perceive the task as an experiment, 
but more as a game or a marketing strategy for the chocolate truffles' brand. 
 The experimenter was located behind a desk with the poster announcing the game and 
he/she explained the task to students who agreed to participate. Once the experiment started, each 
participant (one-by-one) walked to a second desk fifteen feet away to toss a white/black coin 
inside an empty recycling box. Thus, nobody could see the outcome. In the three conditions, if 
the outcome was white (the prize-winning side), the participant grabbed a chocolate truffle from 
another box placed in a third desk situated six feet further, and the experiment ended. If the 
outcome was black (the price-losing side), the task finished in the no penalty condition (NP). In 
the penalty condition (P), the participant left an out-of-pocket cash penalty of any value in a 
recycling box placed in the same desk as the chocolate truffles' box. Finally, in the altruistic 
penalty condition (AP) the out-of-pocket cash penalty was a donation to a non-profit organization. 
Results 
Pure cheating with a chocolate truffle reward 
 We present the results of Experiment 1 in Figure 1. In the no penalty condition (NP), we 
expected participants to over-report white coin-toss results, as they had an incentive (a chocolate 
truffle) to cheat and the impossibility of being caught. The null hypothesis of honest behavior is 
rejected at p = .008 (dotted line) only for the bachelor degree in business economics. The 
anomalous percentage of the prize-winning side (or, as a result, the percentage of chocolate 
truffles taken) in business economics' students (77%; N=69/90) suggests that they cheat more 
often than non-economics –psychologists (53%; N=48/90) and IT engineering students (60%; 
N=54/90)–. In this condition (NP), participants faced a trade-off between the joy of eating a 
chocolate truffle and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of cheating. While 
our evidence indicates that the honesty of psychology and IT engineering' students is not affected 
by this trade-off, the honesty of business economics students is; thus, business economics students 
cheat more than the others. In addition, we have examined gender differences and the results are 
not statistically significant1. 
                                                          
1 There are no significant differences in gender in the four experiments of the paper; thus, men and women 
behave similarly according to our evidence.  
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Cash penalties 
 In the penalty condition (P), where we included the effect of cash penalties on cheating 
behavior, the null hypothesis of honesty is rejected for all bachelor degrees and results are 
statistically significant: students of business economics degree at p = .008 (dotted line), and 
psychology and IT engineering degrees at p = .049 (dashed line), as illustrated in Figure 1. We 
consider the percentage of chocolates takes in all academic degrees is abnormally high, meaning 
that participants probably cheated. The difference of white-toss outcomes between the three 
different groups (business economics, psychologists and IT engineers) is not statistically 
significant (X2 = .000; p = 1). Thus, when participants obtained the prize-losing outcome (black), 
many of them acted like winners, taking the chocolate truffle rather than paying for losing, no 
matter the bachelor degree. This finding shows that cash penalties persuade students to cheat. 
Altruism 
 In the altruistic penalty condition (AP), we added the effect of altruism on cheating 
behavior to the experiment. The null hypothesis of behaving honestly is rejected at p = 0.049 
(dashed line) only for IT engineering students, as shown in Figure 1. While business economics 
and psychology students decreased the percentage of chocolate truffles grabbed (50% or 
N=45/90, and 57% or N=51/90, respectively), IT engineering' students did not (67%; N=60/90). 
This result implies that the altruistic instincts of business economics and psychology students 
show up. Meanwhile, the behavior of IT engineers was not affected by the donation, ignoring the 
moral compass of helping a non-profit organization.  
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
3. Experiment 2: Effects of lying and altruistic donations 
 Considering only the results of Experiment 1, it seems premature to affirm that in a real-
world situation cheating and altruistic behaviors are more remarkable in students in business 
economics than in the other students because they had the incentive of a chocolate truffle instead 
of real money. To ensure the reliability of the results of Experiment 1, we conducted a second 
experiment. 
The purpose of Experiment 2 is to verify if business economics students cheat more than 
psychology and IT engineering students when cash incentives play a role in the design (instead 
of the incentive of a chocolate truffle), and if their donations are the most salient. In addition, we 
also compare the tendency to lie among the three academic degrees. We test the lying behavior 
asking participants about their donations a posteriori (at the end of the experiment). 
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Experiment 2 was conducted in the lab and the task was the same as in Experiment 1: to 
flip a white/black coin in private. Only when winning, the participants received a cash prize that 
they could donate afterwards. However, in the design of this experiment, we were able to 
determine if participants actually cheated in the toss and the exact money they donated. This is 
because they had to report the outcome on a computer and they deposited their donations inside 
envelopes marked with invisible ink. If the findings are consistent with our Experiment 1, we 
expect donations from students in business economics and psychology to be higher than donations 
from IT engineers. In addition, it is rational to believe that the tendency to lie will go in line with 
the cheating behavior. Therefore, we expect lying to be higher in students in business economics, 
followed by psychologists and IT engineers. 
Method 
Participants 
 Ninety students (59% female; N=53/90) from public universities in Madrid joined the 
experiment. They were studying the bachelor degrees of business economics (N = 30), 
psychology (N = 30) and IT engineering (N = 30). Participants enrolled in the task voluntarily, 
and they were paid one euro for participation. 
Design and procedure 
Participants received an envelope with money based on their outcome in the task, 
receiving the full amount when reporting the prize-winning result and no money for the prize-
losing option.  
Once the experimenter explained the task, each participant went to a stall (similar to a 
voting booth) six feet from the experimenter's desk, where there was a computer and a recycling 
box on a table. The computer screen presented the following message: “With your own cell phone, 
log in to www.rollandflip.com and flip a white/black coin. Did you get black or white?” The 
reason for using the participant's phone was to assure that the toss was completely private and 
was not registered in the computer. If the outcome was black (the price-losing side), the task 
ended. If the outcome was white (the prize-winning side), the participant took an envelope 
containing five-euro coins from the recycling box and decided how much to donate to a non-profit 
organization and how much to keep. The participant left the stall, went back to the experimenter's 
desk and placed the envelope with the donation in a cardboard box. Finally, the participant was 
asked to come back to the stall and answer another question that appeared on the screen: “How 
many coins did you donate?” The participant was not warned about that question before 
performing the task. This mechanism allows us to test the lying behavior of students because their 
responses would be matched with their donations, as the envelopes were marked with invisible 
ink. 
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Results 
Pure cheating with a cash reward 
 In Figure 2, we provide a summary of the results of Experiment 2. The null hypothesis of 
honest behavior is rejected at p = .008 (dotted line) for the business economics students. They 
over-reported white outcomes (the prize-winning side) because the percentage of chocolates taken 
(70%; N=63/90) was too high, contrary to non-economics –psychologists (54%; N=49/90) and 
IT engineers (52%; N=47/90)–. This finding goes in agreement with the evidence of Experiment 
1, suggesting that business economics students tend to cheat more that non-economics, regardless 
of the type of earnings (non-monetary, such as a chocolate truffle, or monetary). The honesty of 
psychology and IT engineering students seems not to get affected by any rewards. 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Altruism 
 Donations by participants in Experiment 2 are shown in Figure 3. This analysis only 
contains the winners of the task, as the cash to be donated (five one-euro coins) represented the 
prize for winning. Business economics students donated 73% of the cash (an average of 3.67 
euros) while psychology students donated 64% (3.21 euros) and IT engineering students 60% 
(3.01 euros). Thus, we verify that business economics students have the highest altruistic instincts, 
followed by psychologists and IT engineers, in agreement with the results of Experiment 1. The 
difference between business economics students and non-economics is statistically significant (X2 
= 3.617; p = .038). 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Lying behavior 
 To examine the tendency of participants to lie, we analyzed the responses to the 
unexpected question regarding the cash donated. For this test, we only include the winners of the 
task (the ones who obtained the reward, made the donation and were questioned about the cash 
donated). We found that 6% of both business economics (N=5/90) and psychology students 
(N=5/90) reported more than what they had actually donated, while the IT engineering degree did 
not lie at all. Interestingly, this result validates the expectation that the degree of business 
economics contained the highest number of liars, although the same behavior is found in 
psychology students. 
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4. Experiment 3A: Effects of pure altruism and lying behavior 
 To take a more in-depth look at both the altruistic and the lying behavior of individuals, 
and based on the interesting results found in Experiment 2, we conducted Experiments 3A and 
3B. The purpose of Experiment 3A is to investigate the altruistic behavior (donations) of students 
enrolled in different bachelor degrees and to test their tendency to lie about their donations without 
any prior notice, which means without telling individuals that they will have to report the cash 
donated. 
 In Experiment 3A, there is no coin toss task so that we test altruism for all participants 
(not only for the task winners, as in Experiments 1 and 2). Cash was given to recipients at the 
beginning of the task and they decided how much to donate. If the evidence is consistent with 
Experiment 2, we predict that business economics students would present a stronger altruistic 
profile than non-economics. 
Method 
Participants 
Similar to Experiment 2, 90 students (62% female; N=56/90) from public universities in 
Madrid enrolled in business economics (N = 30), psychology (N = 30) and IT engineering (N = 
30) participated voluntarily. 
Design and procedure 
The participant received an envelope with the five one-euro coins for the donations at the 
beginning of the task so they do not need to leave the stall at any time. Thus, the participant 
decided how many coins to donate, deposited the donation inside the envelope marked with 
invisible ink in the box right next to the computer and answered the question about the money 
donated that appeared on the computer's screen at that moment without any prior awareness. 
Results 
Altruism 
 Cash donated by participants in Experiment 3A appears in Figure 4. Results are similar 
to Experiment 2, including all individuals in this design (the honest and dishonest ones). The 
percentage of cash donated is higher for the business economics students than for the non-
economics, and the difference is statistically significant (X2 = 4.08; p = .029). Business economics 
students donated 76% (3.8 euros on average) while 68% (3.4 euros) was donated by psychologists, 
and donations of IT engineers decreased to 59% (2.9 euros). 
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Lying behavior 
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 Consistent with the lying results of Experiment 2, in response to the question about their 
donations, 7% (N=6/90) of students of the degree in business economics reported more than the 
amount they had really donated, 6% (N=5/90) of psychology students, whereas only 2% (N=2/90) 
of IT engineers lied. 
 
5. Experiment 3B: Effects of prior notice on lying behavior 
 The aim of Experiment 3B is to study the altruistic behavior (donations) of students 
enrolled in different bachelor degrees and to test their tendency to lie about their donations with 
a prior notice, which is telling participants in advance that they will have to report the cash 
donated. 
 Experiment 3B is similar to Experiment 3A with the exception of the prior notice. In 
Experiment 3B, the experimenter warned each participant at the beginning of the task that a 
question about the cash donated would appear on the computer after the donation. According to 
Dellavigna et al. (2016), respondents are concerned about their social image, so they are more 
likely to behave altruistically if they know that they are going to be asked to report their actions 
later. In line with this, we expect that the mechanism of the prior notice will increase donations. 
In addition, due to our results of prior experiments, we also predict that the highest donations 
would be granted by economists. 
Method 
Participants 
 Similar to Experiment 3A, 90 participants (63% female; N=57/90) from public 
universities in Madrid studying bachelor degrees in business economics (N = 30), psychology (N 
= 30) and IT engineering (N = 30) participated voluntarily. 
Design and procedure 
 The design of Experiments 3B and 3A matched, with one difference: in Experiment 3B, 
in the instructions to participants we include the question about reporting the cash donated. 
Therefore, participants received the envelope, performed the task in the stall, donated the cash 
considered and reported the donation. 
Results 
Altruism 
 In Figure 5 we illustrate the cash donated by participants in Experiment 3B. The 
percentage of cash was higher for business economics students than for non-economics with 
statistically significant difference (X2 = 13.8; p < .001). Business economics students donated 89% 
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of the cash earned (4.4 euros on average) while psychology students donated 73% (3.7 euros) and 
IT engineers 59% (3 euros). Results are consistent with Experiment 3A. Participants donate 
slightly more in Experiment 3B, with no significant differences (X2 = 6.0; p = .199). In addition, 
as expected, the prior notice increased donations notably for business economics students and 
psychologists. 
[FIGURE 5 HERE] 
Lying behavior 
 The prior notice not only increased donations but also decreased the tendency to lie. Only 
2% (N=2/90) of business economics students and 1% (N=1/90) of psychologists reported more 
than the amount donated whereas IT engineers did not lie, as in Experiment 2. 
 
6. Discussion and general conclusion 
 The aim of this paper is to examine cheating and altruistic behaviors of university students 
enrolled in several bachelor degrees, namely, business economics, psychology and IT 
engineering. More precisely, we study the effects of different rewards (monetary and non-
monetary) and different penalties (cash penalties or penalties that represent donations to a non-
profit organization) on cheating behavior. Additionally, we also test the connection of altruistic 
and lying behaviors of individuals, by analyzing the tendency to lie about their donations. For 
these purposes, we ran four experiments using a total of 540 participants. Our results are 
consistent among the experiments conducted. In summary, our evidence suggests that business 
economics students cheat more than other individuals regardless of the rewards or the penalties, 
behave more altruistically donating more than others, and do not lie in general about their 
donations (although, if they do, they lie more than others). 
Our evidence in Experiment 1 agrees with prior research that stated that individuals tend 
to cheat (Jacobsen, Fosgaard and Pascual-Ezama, 2018), and this behavior is influenced by 
traditional economic models, based on the cost-benefit approach. The cost-benefit aspect posits 
that when any gain from cheating is high compared to the expected punishment, the propensity to 
behave dishonestly increases. Similar arguments are consistent with traditional models of agency 
theory in economics, which suggest that people make rational, self-interested decisions to cheat 
depending on incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Gino and Pierce, 2009). Accordingly, each 
individual is more likely to act unethically if it results in financial benefits. Business students 
could be more influenced by these models as they have studied them deeply in their university 
readings and lectures. Thus, business economics students are more academically oriented to find 
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an equilibrium between the cost of any decision or investment and its return, and the results of 
Experiment 1 verify this statement. 
Prior research suggested that the self-maintenance concept can lead individuals to behave 
more ethically (Fischbacher and Heusi, 2013; Kunda, 1990; Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi et al., 2011) 
and internalized social norms could guide respondents to a preference for honesty (Pruckner and 
Sausgruber, 2013). When deciding whether to lie or behave ethically, individuals attempt to find 
the balance between obtaining the highest payoff possible and maintaining a positive self-image 
(Gneezy et al., 2012; Grossman, 2014; Lazear, Malmendier and Weber, 2012). In general, 
altruism encourages people to become more unselfish due to the self-concept maintenance theory 
because the possibility of donating will decrease the magnitude of cheating and increase the 
likelihood of altruistic behavior. This mechanism is more salient when an individual's academic 
background emphasizes organizational and cooperative feelings and also self-interest, profit 
maximizing and maintenance of self-image in front of others, such as in the case of business 
economics students, as per the evidence of Experiment 1. Thus, this perspective predicts that 
socially-oriented people or individuals who work in teams and organizations should donate more 
than others, and we corroborate this prediction. Altruism clearly diminishes the impact of cheating 
for business economics and psychology participants and enlarges donations to charity from them. 
This last effect is in line with Gneezy et al.'s conclusions (2014), who found that people who make 
an immoral choice first are more likely to donate to charity afterwards, driven by a temporal 
increase in guilt, which they called conscience accounting. In the case of IT engineering students, 
the results suggest that the altruism effect does not incentivize them to behave more ethically. 
This could be due to their focus in more analytical tasks, less cooperative projects or training with 
less attention to profit maximization. However, this result could also be driven by self-selected 
groups of marginal subjects in each academic degree that may not behave in the same way as 
average people (Houdek, 2017). Last, we corroborate these findings in Experiment 2 using 
different rewards when reporting the price-winning option of the task (a chocolate truffle versus 
a cash reward). 
We also studied the likelihood of lying in Experiments 3A and 3B. By manipulating the 
prior notice given to participants –telling or not telling them in advance that they had to report the 
cash donated– we showed that a prior notice increased participants' likelihood of acting ethically. 
That is, individuals lie less frequently when they will be asked later about their acts. According 
to Dellavigna et al. (2016), respondents are concerned about their social image, so they are more 
likely to behave altruistically if they know that they are going to be asked to report their actions 
later. In addition, lying to maintain the self-image goes in line with the probability of cheating 
and the altruistic behavior, so that business economics students lied more than psychology and IT 
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engineering students. Nevertheless, their altruistic behavior is stronger than that of the other 
groups. 
The implications of these results are relevant for university staff and managers because 
we indicate whether or not different individuals (university students) react ethically or unethically 
to several situations. This work could be of interest not only for identifying unethical behaviors 
at the university level, but also for anticipating how to avoid unethical behaviors in the workplace, 
as the job market is the next step of university students' career. 
Finally, the findings of our study may have implications for researchers examining ethical 
and unethical behaviors in individuals with different academic backgrounds. We obtain valuable 
evidence that business economics students seem to cheat more but behave more altruistically than 
psychology and IT engineering students. This may have important consequences in the real world 
because most of international decisions are based on a financial reasoning and made by 
individuals with business backgrounds. However, some economists have been criticized by social 
organizations for different cases of fraud or corruption, specifically salient during the global 
financial crisis. In this sense, our evidence might shed light on the need for studies regarding 
alternative models in society not only based on financial aspects but also on sociological and 
analytical decisions. Due to the complexity of the current economic context, the political 
environment and the territorial conflicts worldwide, a broader picture offered by decision-makers 
from different backgrounds may help to clarify the various facets of international affairs. For 
instance, the development of more collaborative organizations, altruistically oriented and 
managed by sociologists, such as the “Sharing Economy” (Schor, 2016), could notably assist in 
solving financial and political issues among territories. 
 
 
 
  
15 
 
References 
Bauman, Y., and Rose, E. (2011). Selection or indoctrination: Why do economics students donate 
less than the rest? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 79(3), 318-327. 
Becker, S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. The Economic Dimensions of 
Crime. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 13-68. 
Bowers, W.J. (1964). Student dishonesty and its control in college. New York: Bureau of Applied 
Research, Columbia University. 
Bucciol, A., Cicognani, S., and Montinari, N. (2017). Cheating in Academia: The Relevance of 
Social Factors. Working Papers 15/2017, University of Verona, Department of Economics.  
Carter, J.R., and Irons, M.D. (1991). Are economists different, and if so, why? The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 171-177. 
DellaVigna, S., List, J.A., Malmendier, U., and Rao, G. (2016). Voting to tell others. The Review 
of Economic Studies, 84(1), 143-181. 
Fischbacher, U., and Heusi, F. (2013). Lies in disguise–an experimental study on cheating. 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(3), 525-547. 
Frank, R.H., Gilovich, T., and Regan, D.T. (1993). Does studying economics inhibit cooperation? 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 159-171. 
Gino, F., Ayal, S., and Ariely, D. (2013). Self-serving altruism? The lure of unethical actions that 
benefit others. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93, 285-292. 
Gino, F., Ayal, S., and Ariely, D. (2009). Contagion and differentiation in unethical behavior: 
The effect of one bad apple on the barrel. Psychological Science, 20(3), 393-398. 
Gino, F., and Pierce, L. (2009). Dishonesty in the name of equity. Psychological Science, 20(9), 
1153-1160. 
Gneezy, U., Imas, A., and Madarász, K. (2014). Conscience accounting: Emotion dynamics and 
social behavior. Management Science, 60(11), 2645-2658. 
Gneezy, A., Imas, A., Brown, A., Nelson, L.D., and Norton, M.I. (2012). Paying to be nice: 
Consistency and costly prosocial behavior. Management Science, 58(1), 179-187.  
Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: The role of consequences. The American Economic Review, 95(1), 
384-394. 
Grossman, Z. (2014). Strategic ignorance and the robustness of social preferences. Management 
Science, 60(11), 2659-2665. 
16 
 
Hill, J.P., and Kochendorfer, R.A. (1969). Knowledge of peer success and risk of detection as 
determinants of cheating. Developmental Psychology, 1(3), 231-238. 
Houdek, P. (2017). A perspective on research on dishonesty: limited external validity due to the 
lack of possibility of self-selection in experimental designs. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 
1566. 
Houser, D., Vetter, S., and Winter, J. (2012). Fairness and cheating. European Economic Review, 
56(8), 1645-1655. 
Hu, Y.A., and Liu, D.Y. (2003). Altruism versus egoism in human behavior of mixed motives. 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 62(4), 677-705. 
Jacobsen, C., Fosgaard, T.R., and Pascual‐Ezama, D. (2018). Why do we lie? A practical guide 
to the dishonesty literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, 32(2), 357-387. 
Jensen, M.C., and Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 480-498. 
Laband, D.N., and Beil, R.O. (1999). Are economists more selfish than other social scientists? 
Public Choice, 100(1-2), 85-101. 
Lazear, E.P., Malmendier, U., and Weber, R.A. (2012). Sorting in experiments with application 
to social preferences. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(1), 136-163 
Lewis, A., Bardis, A., Flint, C., Mason, C., Smith, N., Tickle, C., and Zinser, J. (2012). Drawing 
the line somewhere: An experimental study of moral compromise. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 33(4), 718-725. 
López-Pérez, R., and Spiegelman, E. (2019). Do economists lie more? In Dishonesty in 
Behavioral Economics (Ch. 3.1).  
Lundquist, T., Ellingsen, T., Gribbe, E., and Johannesson, M. (2009). The aversion to lying. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70(1), 81-92. 
Maggian, V. (2019). Negative Externalities of Cheating: An Experiment with Charities. In 
Dishonesty in Behavioral Economics (Ch. 3.3).  
Marwell, G., and Ames, R.E. (1981). Economists free ride, does anyone else? Experiments on the 
provision of public goods, IV. Journal of Public Economics, 15(3), 295-310.  
Mazar, N., Amir, O., and Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-
concept maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research, 45(6), 633-644. 
17 
 
Mazar, N., and Ariely, D. (2006). Dishonesty in everyday life and its policy implications. Journal 
of Public Policy & Marketing, 25(1), 117-126. 
McCabe, D.L., and Treviño, L.K. (1993). Academic dishonesty: Honor codes and other 
contextual influences. Journal of Higher Education, 64(5), 522-538. 
Michaels, J.W., and Miethe, T.D. (1989). Applying theories of deviance to academic 
cheating. Social Science Quarterly, 70(4), 870.  
Pascual-Ezama, D., Fosgaard, T.R., Cardenas, J.C., Kujal, P., Veszteg, R., Gil-Gómez de Liaño, 
B., Gunia, B., Weischselbaumer, D., Hilken, K., Antinyan, A., Delnoij, J., Proestakis, A., 
Tira, M.D., Pratomo, Y., Jaber-López, T., and Brañas-Garza, P. (2015). Context-dependent 
cheating: Experimental evidence from 16 countries. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 116, 379-386. 
Pascual-Ezama, D., Prelec, D., and Dunfield, D. (2013). Motivation, money, prestige and cheats. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93, 367-373. 
Pruckner, G.J., and Sausgruber, R. (2013). Honesty on the streets: A field study on newspaper 
purchasing. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(3), 661-679. 
Schor, J. (2016). Debating the sharing economy. Journal of Self-Governance & Management 
Economics, 4(3). 
Shalvi, S., Dana, J., Handgraaf, M.J., and De Dreu, C.K. (2011). Justified ethicality: Observing 
desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115(2), 181-190. 
Yezer, A.M., Goldfarb, R.S., and Poppen, P.J. (1996). Does studying economics discourage 
cooperation? Watch what we do, not what we say or how we play. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 10(1), 177-186. 
18 
 
Table 1. Experiment summary table. Summary of all experiments, including experiment number, purpose, task and conditions, participants and location. 
Experiment Purpose Experiment task and conditions Participants and location 
1 
With the possibility of earning one 
chocolate truffle, examine the effect of 
cash penalties and donations on cheating 
behavior of students with different 
academic backgrounds. 
Flip a white/black coin in private (white: prize-winning 
side; black: prize-losing side). A chocolate truffle earned 
when winning, and task finished. 3 conditions when losing: 
- No penalty condition (NP) or control condition: when 
losing, no penalty and task finished. 
- Penalty condition (P): when losing, a cash penalty was 
requested (out-of-pocket and participant was warned 
about it before performing the task). 
- Altruistic penalty condition (AP): when losing, a 
donation was requested (out-of-pocket and participant 
was warned about it before performing the task). 
270 students randomly assigned 
(90 business economics; 90 
psychologists; 90 IT engineers). 
In the university campus (outside 
the lab). 
2 
With the possibility of earning 5 euros, 
examine: 
- The effect of donations on cheating 
behavior of students with different 
academic backgrounds. 
- Their tendency to lie about their 
donations. 
Flip a white/black coin in private. When losing, the task 
finished. When winning, the participant received 5-euro 
coins, a voluntary donation of those coins was requested 
and participant was asked about the money donated 
(participant was NOT warned about it before performing 
the task). 
90 students randomly assigned 
(30 business economics; 30 
psychologists; 30 IT engineers). 
In the lab. 
3A 
- Examine the altruistic behavior 
(donations) of students with different 
academic backgrounds. 
- Test their tendency to lie about their 
donations WITHOUT a prior notice. 
The participant received 5-euro coins, a voluntary donation 
of those coins was requested and participant was asked 
about the money donated (participant was NOT aware of it 
before performing the task). 
90 students randomly assigned 
(30 business economics; 30 
psychologists; 30 IT engineers). 
In the lab. 
3B 
- Examine the altruistic behavior 
(donations) of students with different 
academic backgrounds. 
- Test their tendency to lie about their 
donations WITH a prior notice. 
The participant received 5-euro coins, a voluntary donation 
of those coins was requested and participant was asked 
about the money donated (participant was aware of it before 
performing the task). 
90 students randomly assigned 
(30 business economics; 30 
psychologists; 30 IT engineers). 
In the lab. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of chocolate truffles taken (prize-winning outcome) per condition and 
bachelor degree in Experiment 1 (Binomial significant differences) 
 
In Figure 1, the cheating results of Experiment 1 appears. The X axis shows the three different 
conditions run in the experiment: NP = No penalty; P = Penalty; AP = Altruistic penalty; and the 
three types of participants: business economics, psychology and IT engineering students. The Y 
axis indicates the percentage of chocolate truffles taken, that is, the number of times that 
participants reported the white outcome (prize-winning outcome). 
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Figure 2. Percentage of coins taken (prize-winning outcome) by bachelor degree in Experiment 
2 (Binomial significant differences) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the cheating results of Experiment 2. The X axis shows the three different types 
of participants: business economics, psychology and IT engineering students. The Y axis indicates 
the percentage of rewards (cash) taken, that is, the number of times that participants reported the 
white outcome (prize-winning outcome). 
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Figure 3. Money Donated (percentage) in Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows a graph with the percentage of cash donated (out of five euros) per group of 
participants (business economics, psychology and IT engineering students) in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 4. Money Donated (in percentage) in Experiment 3A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The graph in Figure 4 includes cash donated (in percentage, out of five euros) per group of 
participants (business economics, psychology and IT engineering students) in Experiment 3A. 
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Figure 5. Money Donated (in percentage) in Experiment 3B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the percentage of cash donated (out of five euros) per group of participants 
(business economics, psychology and IT engineering students) in Experiment 3B. 
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